Like a Deer Caught in the Car’s Headlights:  
Spatial Justice and Animals

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Animals are the subject of increasingly virulent mobilizations, controversies and contemporary crises, developed about breeding and killing conditions, well-being, animal experimentation and meat diet. Although considering human beings as benefiting from the selfish exploitation of animals seems to become self-evident, it feels as though it has not been properly thought through. It seems even more suspicious when considering that those who point out animal exploitation have little knowledge of real animals. For Laurent Joffrin (a famous French editorialist) the fact that animals were taken into account in parties’ platforms for the French presidential election in 2017, is an obvious sign that “little by little, civilization is progressing” (Libération, April 3 2017).

This criticism leaves us (the authors) stunned and baffled, a bit like a deer caught in the car’s headlights, because this movement – that we will call ‘animalist’, fully aware that it is made up of diverse trends – is slowly dominating in the media and political discourses, even though it represents a very small minority (with a few thousand activists in France and a few millions worldwide?). Moreover, although this movement has only recently spread, much has already been written to support animals since antiquity and the Enlightenments, not forgetting the numerous non-Western ontologies respectful of animals. But “Little by little, civilization is progressing”… These optimistic words sound rather strange: would it mean that human beings working in abattoirs, farmers doing their best to breed their animals, cat and dog lovers are barbarians that all need to be civilized, publicly pointed to, before being locked up? Where do these spotlights putting humanity on trial come from? What social, political or spatial project is spotlighted in order to defend animals?

Resulting from a literature review carried out by three scholars in geography, interested in animals and spatial justice , this article questions the way justice is invoked by theoreticians, to conceive of animals in society. Rather than reproducing an exhaustive review, our aim is to identify different leads for research on social justice (is it being widened or transformed by taking animals into account?), on animals (are they subjected to or do they benefit from justice?), and on areas where humans and animals evolve (what animal ethics justify forms of apartheid or forms of communal living?). Due to the necessarily constrained size of an article, we will oversimplify the diversity of approaches, by highlighting two poles (the welfarist reformists on the one hand, and the antiespeciesist abolitionists on the other) from which arise of course diverging positions, debates, scissions and symbolic struggles. However, this article does not aim at producing a sociology of animalist movements.

What we are trying to understand is how animalist justice is built-up , sometimes trying to include animals in the theories and applications of justice, and sometimes trying to include justice in studies on animals. To what extent do they also induce injustice? It seems to us that the more radical animalist approaches – called abolitionist because they advocate the end of any animal exploitation – are misjudging the complexity of relations uniting humans and animals. They tend to recommend separatist measures, aiming at isolating animals from humans, which
questions social justice and animal welfare. Together with other research trends, we plead for a more inclusive and contextualised vision of relations between humans and animals, based on understanding their coexistence, companionship or labour relations. Our position is meant to be materialistic, not a limited form of materialism advocating that animal breeding serves only to produce meat, but a wider form which assumes that breeding is also – and perhaps above all – a practice that serves to establish and maintain links between humans and animals (Porcher, 2011). Two fundamental paradigms of geography are summoned in these questionings: on the one hand, the analysis of space as a social construct with, in this case, spatial and social logics of segregation between humans and animals, and on the other, an analysis of the society-nature relation, and more specifically of the dichotomies between human and non-human, nature and culture, with animals being referred to one side or another, depending on the approach adopted.

Emergence of Animalist Justice

Reviewing Anthropocentric Social Justice

Most social justice theoreticians, or at least those JSSJ relied on, John Rawls, Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser in particular (see Bret, 2009, as well as the book review of that issue), took little interest, if any, in animals; their theories of justice are anthropocentric. Philosophies based on a sense of injustice, like those of Iris Marion Young (1990) or Nancy Fraser (1995, 2000), are speechless about animal issues. This lack of interest can be explained by the fact that they do not seek to develop a universal theory of justice, but start from actual experiences of the feeling of injustice, by social groups defined by the discriminating functioning of institutions. Yet, the animal experience or feeling of injustice can only be transmitted indirectly.

J. Rawls (1997) details in paragraphs frequently attacked by animalists, the reason why his theory leaves animals aside. In his social contract theory, principles of justice are defined by the mutual agreement of social partners, conceived of as rational individuals endowed with a sense of right and wrong. Human beings can define what is fair because they are moral subjects, capable of having a rational life project and a sense of justice: i.e. an efficient desire to apply these principles of justice and to act accordingly, up to a certain degree. Rawls concedes that this sense of justice and capacity for being a moral subject remains ill defined, that these characteristics are grown unequally depending on individuals, and that its potential is unequally materialized. Those who are deprived of it more or less permanently, such as handicapped persons, constitute a “marginal case” which he does not intend to deal with, but which, in his view, does not invalidate his theory as a whole. Likewise, Rawls at once keeps animals outside the conception and application field of his theory of justice, by rejecting the possibility that animals can be considered as moral subjects. On this point, he adopts “the general belief according to which they are different, and according to which we consider that the principles of justice only apply to relations being human beings”. Animals must therefore be treated “humanely and compassionately”, but... “While I have not maintained that the capacity for a sense of justice is necessary in order to be owed the duties of justice, it does seem that we are not required to give strict justice anyway to creatures lacking this capacity” (p. 448).

Bases for Animal Ethics: A Community of Suffering Beings
The concern for animal justice, i.e. the desire to prove rationally that human beings treat animals badly because they treat them unfairly, forms the basis of animal ethics. By relying on the comparison between human and animal species, animalists have therefore tackled the issue of “marginal cases” to criticize the incompleteness of social justice theories, Rawls’ in particular. In all major comprehensive animalist philosophical works, from Singer ([1975] 2012) to Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011), via Regan (1983) or Francione (1995), dozens of pages are dedicated to mentally handicapped persons whose situation is compared with that of animals. Most often, these involve thinking experiences confronting individual moral choices under extreme conditions. The life boat ethics example often comes back: a human being endowed with reason has to choose to sacrifice either an animal in full possession of its faculties, or “a person with severe mental disability”. Indeed, for these authors, animals can be considered as human children or handicapped humans: individuals who are recognized as having a place in the community and therefore rights, but whose state of incompleteness linked to their age or handicap prevents from having the same obligations.

Like mentally handicapped persons, animals are not machines but sentient beings that can feel pain, desire, and are therefore endowed with self-interest. According to Singer and species egalitarianism thinkers, such as Regan or Francione, animals are the subject of moral considerations due to their capacity to feel and particularly to suffer, i.e. due to their sentience or, to put it in a more complex way following Regan, they are the “subjects of a life”. Because they are sentient beings, they must integrate the justice community; it then becomes impossible to morally pretend to defend any form of exploitation. This assumption constitutes a fundamental point which making sense for the majority of animal activists. It is, referring to this point that the animalist NGO L214 chose its name and militant identity, L214 being the number of the article in the French Rural Code which recognizes that animals are sentient (sensibles, in french).

This agreement on animal sentience is rooted among most animalists, particularly in Singer’s work, in a utilitarian approach. The utilitarian doctrine was elaborated at the beginning of the 19th century by Jeremy Bentham (and refined by John Stuart Mill). It points out that “the only conceivable rational criterion of ethics and justice reside [in] the greatest happiness of the largest number. Any particular action, law, regulation, moral precept, etc. contributing to its growth is fair, moral and virtuous. Anything that tends to reduce it must, on the other hand, be rejected. In this regard, intentions of which the purity cannot always be decided are of little importance. Only the objective result and the consequences matter. As such, utilitarianism represents the “consequentialist” philosophy par excellence” (Caillé, 2001). Animals being sentient, the principle of the “greatest happiness of the largest number” applies. Killing animals causes greater unhappiness to animals than meat consumption causes happiness to humans; therefore, animals must not be killed. Practicing what he preached, Jeremy Bentham was vegetarian, and since then the issue of animal sentience has been linked to the utilitarian doctrine, to such an extent that it has become difficult to refer to one without calling for a reasoning stemming from the other.

**Egalitarianism between Species**

The issue of sentience makes it possible to establish parallels between relations of exploitation between humans as well as between humans and animals. Provocatively, Singer opens his Animal Liberation with a comparison between women’s status and animals, the title referring to “women’s liberation”. There are numerous references to slave abolition, the animalization of
slaves and Black people being used to undermine them, to refute their status as persons and their exploitation.

“Slavery was not humanised: it was abolished. The issue was not about making chains longer or improving travelling conditions in the hold of ships. It was about knowing whether the actual practice was fair. It is in these terms that some abolitionists today tackle the problem of animal exploitation. The issue, as they say, is not to make kennels wider or to improve the way farm animals are slaughtered. Being antiracist does not mean to make racism more acceptable, more humane or friendlier: it means to eliminate it” (Jeangène Vilmer, 2015, p. 17).

Another daring parallel: comparing abattoirs with gas chambers in Nazi extermination camps. In this regard, Holocaust historian and animal partisan Charles Patterson (2002) talks about “an eternal Treblinka”. This reference is completely endorsed by other, yet more measured publications, as in Donaldson’s Zoopolis and Kimlicka’s publication, which we will talk about further on.

Referring to abolitionism, to the fight against racism or that in favor of feminism, allows animalists to line up in the glorious genealogy of the defenders of minorities, the depreciated, the denied and the oppressed, thereby legitimating their movement. According to them, their fights only appear as surprising or outrageous insofar as they are ahead of their time: society has not yet reached that stage of consciousness that will, later make it adopt norms that, today, only belong to the realm of dreams and utopia.

From Animal Ethics to Socio-Animal Justice

Singer, Regan or Francione sought to build an ethics aiming at proving that animals are a subject of moral consideration and that, more often than not, animal exploitation is unfair. However, the term justice is not to be found in the index of Animal liberation, Peter Singer’s founding work. Regan and Francione intend to prove that animals have moral rights, like people do, and fundamental rights in particular, to protect them against any form of exploitation. The idea though is not to define positive rights. In Singer, as in the followers of species egalitarianism, the vocabulary of animal rights is hinged onto an ethics. Yet none of these authors seeks to develop, based on this ethics, a theory of justice, and even less an inclusive theory valid for both humans and animals. Furthermore, they have little interest in human society, apart from the fact that society’s actions on animals are negative. Here an issue of vocabulary arises concerning the distinction between ethics, moral standards and justice, which are often vague in everyday language, as they are in animalist theories. In this paper, we have considered ethics as a system of thoughts to determine what is good and what is bad, moral standards as a set of rules for actions based on ethics, and justice as a set of political principles to define the institutionalized organization of rules for living in common, leading to the definition of rights and obligations guaranteed and punished by law, usually in conformity with moral standards and ethics. As such, while lying might be immoral, it is not automatically unfair.

By contrast, an increasing number of animalist theoreticians proclaim a political and inclusive approach, specifically focused on justice (Cochrane et al., 2016). According to them, they stand out for their concern to put aside the debate on moral issues, leading to divisions (such as extending the legal and moral status of persons to animals), which prove to be inefficient when defending animals, because they are socially contested. Rather, they propose to think about positive rights that would be acceptable and applicable today, in Western societies at least. The fundamental and central concept of this political approach in favor of animals would be justice precisely, an inclusive justice that would make it possible to organize relations between human
beings and between humans and animals. In this case also, several approaches of political philosophies coexist, and not all are based on defending animals? Martha Nussbaum, together with Amartya Sen, developed a theory of justice oriented on capability, to look at the concrete living conditions of persons, inseparable from their dignity. Applying this capability approach to the “marginal cases” left out by Rawls, Nussbaum in Frontiers of Justice (2009), tackled the problems related to animals. According to her, “animals are entitled to a wide range of capabilities to function, those that are most essential to a flourishing life, a life worthy of the dignity of each creature” (p. 392). Seeking to satisfy these capabilities should make it possible to build a fair social order, one that includes humans and non-humans. Nussbaum made a list of ten “functional capabilities” for animals, adapted from human capabilities: the rights to life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotion, practical reason (i.e. the right to develop one’s own projects), capability of having mutual rewarding relationships with other species, play, and control over one’s own environment (see also Afeissa and Jeangène Vilmer, 2010).

Zoopolis by Donaldson and Kymlicka (2013), stood out in animalist literature by asserting the power and founding nature of social relations linking human and animal societies. According to these authors, there are inalienable rights (the right to not be killed in particular) – such rights falling in line with antispeciesist advocacy, by using the founding ethics according to which animal exploitation must end. To these rights, they add other highly original rights, which they describe as “relational”. These relational rights do not rely on species taxonomy, but on the degree and type of interactions between humans and animals. According to the authors, a certain type of sovereignty and citizenship applies to each one of these scenarios: wild animals, liminal animals (which in fact are commensal animals), and domestic animals. In a way, it is more about a-speciesist than antispeciesist theory: a hedgehog, depending on its way of life, will be considered as coming under the citizenship of wild, liminal or domestic animals. Categories in this case are purely relational, and therefore political.

“Wild animals” do not seek to live in close proximity to humans. We must therefore consider them as citizens of a sovereign animal community, recognized as such by other sovereign human communities, like international relations between States. Therefore we must not seek to intervene or try to regulate their impacts.

“Liminal animals” are not domestic animals, but they nonetheless seek to live in close proximity to humans who bring them important food resources, warmth in urban areas to spend winter in or many housing opportunities. As such, a city represents a specific ecological niche around which wholes species gravitate (such as magpies). With these animals, it appears that relations and contacts are difficult to abolish at the stroke of a pen, since rural, urban and domestic space is intended to remain shared with cockroaches, pigeons, hedgehogs, Canadian geese, squirrels, rats or raccoons. We must thus consider that they belong to a different sovereignty than ours, that they do not automatically want to become integrated into our community, and therefore cannot benefit from the same rights as “domestic animals”.

“Domestic animals”, totally dependent on humans for their survival and, very often, attached to maintaining individual relations with people, must on the contrary be considered as fellow citizens of our justice community, now defined as a “humanimal” community, in which they take part via human representatives of course.

Animalist Vocabulary: Stage Point
After understanding the diversity of animalist ethics and pro-animal movements inspired by them, readers at this stage might feel lost with the abundant terminology. They are also like the deer caught in the car’s headlights. Within the framework of this article, without minimizing the specificities of each authors position, we will seek to simplify the analysis by opposing, on the one hand, the partisans of animal welfare, sometimes described as protectionists or welfarists and, on the other, antispeciesist movements, also called abolitionist or “animal liberation” movements.

The authors quoted belong to the abolitionist movement, even if this category is oversimplified, where the same term has different meanings depending on the author. The term ‘abolitionist’, according to Peter Singer for example, refers to a movement aiming at abolishing animal exploitation. According to Gary Francione whose writings are more recent, the end of animal exploitation calls for abolishing any form of concrete relation between humans and animals. Donaldson and Kymlicka, as already mentioned, find this last point excessive and counterproductive. Likewise, the terms of speciesist and antispeciesist can be ambiguous. According to Peter Singer as well as Tom Regan or Donaldson and Kymlicka, speciesism refers to systems of moral justification based on the so-called superiority of one species over another, and antispeciesism is therefore the ideology that contests hierarchy between species, and human domination over the other species in particular. However, according to other authors, especially those publishing in the French activist journal Cahiers antispécistes (Bonnardel, 2005; David, 1994), antispeciesism is about contesting the very notion of species. Just as there is no physiological or genetic basis for the scientific definition of objectifiable human races, barriers between species are taxonomic constructions essentially meant to categorise and justify human superiority.

We use the terms ‘speciesism’ and ‘abolitionism’ in their oldest and most classical sense, as originally popularized in the works of Peter Singer who, in fact, marked the break between abolitionism, as found in animal liberation movements, and older movements of animal protection, run in the name of animal welfare, or even in the name of public morality (such as avoiding to inflict violence onto animals in public).

The term ‘veganism’ further complicates the expression. Veganism requires that any animal product be avoided in one’s diet (as with vegetarianism), but to a particularly high level of purity (no dairy, eggs or honey) and, beyond feeding, in clothing (no leather, wool or silk among others) and as a general rule, in everyday life (no wax, animal traction etc.). More than an orthorexia, it is an applied and radical form of antispeciesist ethics.

Animalist Injustice

Ambiguities and Contradictions in Antispeciesist Approaches

Generally, antispeciesism, on a utilitarian basis, assumes that exploitation encompasses all relations between humans and animals, particularly those concerning domestication.

It would always be wrong. We speak here of a purely human ethics which is meant to be disconnected from the empathy we could have for animals. This position is translated in Peter Singer’s work, into a fundamental assertion with no ambiguity: he doesn’t have to love animals (Singer, 2012, p.57). He seeks to prove rationally that their treatment is bad and unfair, and wants to single out from protectionists who have compassion for animals, but also from Rawls who writes that animals must be treated humanely. Yet, it ensues from Singer’s assertion that
humans are always suspected of wanting to forget this moral sense, disconnected from empathy, or at least of not finding the strength to cultivate that quality, since it does not rely on any solid foundation. That’s what Thifaine Lagarde, the chairperson of NGO 269 Libération animale, states: “I find it difficult to believe in the possibility of a society where all species would share the same space, without humans falling back on their old failings and reproducing a form of domination over the other animals” (Philosophie Magazine, n°113, October 2017).

Philosophically and historically, our analysis is to consider that antispeciesism is actually strengthening Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian philosophy of social justice – the very philosophy that prevailed in the United States and Great Britain until John Rawls, in 1970, with his work entitled A Theory of Justice, came to re-establish the contractualist arguments of justice (Bret, 2009). But this revival of utilitarian philosophy comes with certain ambiguities, or even fundamental contradictions. While only certain theoreticians (Singer in the first place) claim to adhere to utilitarianism, all, including those who claim to adhere to Rawlsian contractualism or Amartya Sen’s capabilities, base their reasoning on the sentience argument, as the basis for a justice community.

This explains some of the contradictions found in Zoopolis. Asserting itself clearly as an extension of the animal rights theory in line with Tom Regan, the book offers its theory of relational rights as an extension of absolute animal rights, which are presented in the first chapter as a first stage. This first utilitarian chapter quickly closes the debate on many subjects, such as the issue of killing, which is blown away in three lines. Donaldson’s and Kymlicka’s project is to reinvent a type of relation, that exists and has been existing from milleniums, as breeding relations. They try to do so by removing animal killing from the equation. Where breeding is a situation in which, when animals are born, others must die, Zoopolis offers a project of cohabitation, with no killing. This explains why Zoopolis is successful with animalist activists; it also explains its paradoxes (e.g. a drastic reduction in the number of domestic animals, with the disappearance of herds and the maintenance of a few individual animals whose genetic pool will rapidly lack in variability; the issue of the end of the animals’ lives – shall we have palliative care for a toothless or cancer-developing ewe?). A fundamental ambiguity remains: how to combine the antispeciesist nature of this first chapter with the a-speciesist nature of the following ones?

These theoretical contradictions have already been pointed out, for example by philosopher Etienne Bimbenet (2017), for whom the success of antispeciesism relies on a more general agreement of 21st-century liberal societies, about purely individualist ethics. As “sentient” who can suffer because off treatments inflicted by those surrounding them, human as well as animal individuals must be protected against external attacks. In this case, the environment is defined as everything that exceeds an individual’s corporal limit; it is an attack, never a matrix, never a development of the being.

The other problem with antispeciesism is the way they go from theory to practice: the conditions for the practical application of animalist justice often lead to many reversals.

Will Abolishing Spatial and Species Barriers Help to Rebuild them Better?

At first glance, the end of animal exploitation appears as a clear objective, with veganism as a simple answer to it, with its way of life and applied ethics. Since all relations humans have with animals are defined as strictly utilitarian (caring, comforting, eating, working among others) yet unfair from the utilitarianism perspective (always favoring human interests), antispeciests must materialize their ethics into practices: veganism. They endeavor to break relationships they
describe as exploitation. But this goes beyond individual asceticism, for actions must be collective and practical. Therefore, a gradation and an agenda are often recommended by NGOs such as L214. The first goal is to target the meat industry or laboratory experiments, like in the United States, during the 1970s, with the direct actions of the Animal Liberation Front.

It is this priority targeting on the food-processing, pharmaceutical or cosmetic industry, which can sometimes lead to confuse antispeciesist initiatives with those of anti-industrial resistance movements, which they definitely are not. Indeed, antispeciesism advocates using food substitutes of industrial origin, to counter the deficiencies induced by vegan diets. Since they deprive agriculture from animal manure, they seek in fertilizers agronomic solutions to soil impoverishment. In order to change eating habits without using militant persuasion, these movements also support research on cultured (or “in vitro”) meat, a completely artificial process, making it possible to produce animal proteins without having to kill them (Porcher, 2010a).

Antispeciesists ground their initiatives on utilitarian philosophy: only results – not intentions – matter. Because of their vices, their tendency to act individually outside the moral principles that should govern all species, humans are too fallible, they cannot be trusted enough to maintain any relationship with animals. That’s what the chairperson of 269 Libération animale assumes: “Emancipation goes through separation between the respective territories of human and non-human animals. (...) We must give animals their freedom back, even if the price to pay is the end of domestic animals” (Philosophie Magazine, n°113, October 2017).

Sometimes, the recommended practical solution is to recreate the great wall separating humans from animals, culture from nature. Paradoxically, while antispeciesists call for egalitarianism between species, the suggested solution often implies putting them aside in the most radical way possible. If the idea is to bring down the walls of animal captivity, whatever their conditions, then the problem does not lie in the size of the cage or the field, but in the actual enclosure. Nonetheless, the advocated solution leads to rebuilding another enclosure, since the goal is to separate the animal world from that of humans. In which case there is no longer any exploitation, but there is also no longer any emotional, aesthetic or, obviously, carnal pleasure, not to mention the condemnation of zoophilia as exemplified in Brown and Rasmussen (2010): it provokes a “moral panic” which finds its resolution in the establishment of laws punishing the practice. Domestication being defined as the initial evil, it is also condemned: humans and animals cannot share the same house, live together or cohabitate. For the more radical, these concepts are translated spatially into reserved territories. As if the best way to recognize equality between human and animal species was not to abolish borders, but to rebuild some on different scales, in order to protect animals from humans.

In this matter, antispeciesism is very much like a tendency of environmental justice which has already been observed and criticized (André-Lamat, Mellac 2012): that of counting and measuring, in order to define the right size of the geographic enclosures dedicated to humans and animals.

More pragmatic in their approach, Donaldson and Kymlicka, in Zoopolis, keep the notion of separate territory for wild animals, whose behaviors testify that they do not seek relations with the human species. In these territories, animals could be recognized as sovereign, meaning free to self-determinate, and autonomous, preventing any relation with humans. Though pragmatic, such zonings are linked to highly rigid types of relationships with places, being elsewhere, on the threshold or here. In Zoopolis, each citizenship is strongly linked to the place from which it is enacted, which prefigures many problems that will surely arise with ‘marginal cases’: what shall
happen when a “wild” animal leaves his ‘elsewhere’ to come ‘here’ (which is what elephants or grizzly bears do regularly)?

As such, most antispeciesist movements and approaches recommend a geographic space of separate development, or even space of exclusion. If antispeciesism claims to be in line with the tradition of struggle movements (e.g. against racism or feminist struggles) doesn’t this contradict though, their underlying principles of justice?

**Interventionism on Animals**

Another fundamental contradiction of abolitionist approaches is that the end of animal exploitation, especially farm animals, implies their physical disappearance and putting an end to their reproduction, either by euthanasia, sterilisation or sexual abstinence. What justifies such authoritarianism is that they are identified as man-made species, selected only to comply with human consumption: deformed creatures, steaks on legs, milk factories, soft petting hair. Cows, dogs, horses, chickens, ducks, sheep and goats among others, are then doomed to disappear, or at best reintroduced into the wild in most antispeciesists literature, from Peter Singer to Gary Francione.

Debates are strong though in the animalist community about what exactly should be done with wild animals on their reserved territories. They range from one extreme to the other. While in Zoopolis we figure that humans should not intervene “with” wild animals even in the case of a cataclysmic event causing extinctions, others on the contrary, think that ethical entrepreneurship justifies governing their private lives. Horta (2010), for example, recommends to regulate violence between wild animals, and considers granting primacy to herbivores over carnivores by sterilizing wild predators.

We would like to point out the paradoxical convergence between these abolitionist approaches and Nussbaum’s inclusive approach, which grants animals capabilities similar to human beings’, in order to build a fair social order including humans and non-humans. This order is, according to Nussbaum, incompatible with the very idea of nature because it requires enlightened paternalism towards animals. In order for animals to live according to the same principles of justice as humans, the latter must teach animals to become vegetarians, to replace their natural tendency for predation with games, using substitute prey... taking as example the tiger at the Bronx zoo who plays with a foam ball instead of jumping on gazelles.

**Cut off from Humans, Cut off from the World?**

Another problematic aspect of these approaches, is their disconnection from ecological thinking (which studies relations between living beings and their biotope), and ecologist thinking (which seeks to preserve ecosystem balances). Animalist and ecologist movements have indeed completely different roots, genealogies, actors and social bases (Garner, 2013). Admittedly, there are a few convergences in terms of position, activist strategies and practical measures such as, for example, condemning companies that have a harmful impact on the planet (on animals as well as ecosystems), choosing animal mascots, defending the protection of wild animals (and ecosystems) in protected areas, vegetarian diets (which can be caused by the desire to spare animals, but also natural resources in general since producing meat requires more cultivated land and water for the same caloric input).

Ecologist ethics, like that of Arne Næss (2013), seeks to conceive of relations between societies and nature, or even the cosmos, by insisting on the complexity of interrelations of mutual dependency, and by seeking to extend the status of persons to “nature”. Næss’ thinking is based
on the link and continuity between human beings, the remainder of the living, ecosystems, or even the world. Animalists, on the contrary, have narrowed their focus on animals, excluding the remainder of the living. While their denunciation is based on animal sentience and requires the same fate for human and animals, these positions cannot include non-sentient living beings—or considered as such—for the time being, such as insects or plants. Adopting ecosophist positions (that seek to conceive of human action as an element among others of the multiple ecosystemic relations), would undermine one of the foundations of animalist ethics: the distinction between sentient and non-sentient beings.

Yet, how should we conceive of the animal issue without also thinking about bioclimatic change, the sixth species extinction crisis, and the extremely complex interrelations of these ecological crises with societies? For this reason, vegan solutions with a view to banishing animal exploitation, have not really been thought through in relation to contemporary environmental crises, and can turn out to be hardly ecological. Animal labour is often far more ecological than many of the technologies proposed by antispeciesists. As such, animal manure is less harmful to soils, water and their faunas, than fertilizers; leather is less dependent on fossil energies and is more degradable than plastic; animal traction creates less greenhouse gas or fine particles than internal combustion engines or steam engines. Some ecological recommendations actually rely on animal exploitation, or to be more specific on exploiting the function of certain animals in ecosystems: ladybirds are for example bred to fight plant lice and other insects deemed harmful. Focusing on animals as a species, and in fact more often on a specific species that, for cultural reasons, is deemed more worthy of interest than others (Lorimer, 2007), has of course global consequences on all living species and biotopes. Problems caused by reintroducing certain species into the wild are well-known: they end up considerably modifying host ecosystems at other species expense. As an example, opening the cages of rose-ringed parakeets in London, Brussels or Paris, ended up threatening other birds (Berthier et al., 2017). In India, the liberation of cull cows, after the quasi-prohibition to slaughter them, compromises wild herbivores’ survival since cows are now consuming their resources (Bruckert, 2016).

Relations between humans and animals are embedded in a complex web of social and ecosystemic relationships. Acting upon human-animal relations, whether we want it or not, means acting on interconnected relations that are extremely difficult to imagine, which concern all living beings, plants, animals, humans and non-humans, a fact which is rarely taken into account … but which has serious consequences for all animals, including humans.

**Humanimal Community**

The issues raised by abolitionist approaches concern not only biological but also social systems. When denouncing cattle breeding as a whole, from cow factories to nomadic herding, from automatic milking systems to reindeer-drawn sledges, are not abolitionists rallying injustice as well as lacking critical thought? At no time do they offer a detailed, socially informed reading, of the diversity and complexity of the relations linking humans and animals.

Into which production regime does this complexity fit? Would it allow both humans and animals to emancipate? Has the issue of animal killing, which remains the marker par excellence of abolitionist approaches, been thought through, beyond the obvious evil it seems to embody (Porcher, 2014)? Animal farming, whether for meat production, for the SPCA, in a veterinary clinic, with pets or at the zoo, has to do with life, and induces therefore managing death,
whether natural death, slaughtering, euthanasia or sterilization. Therefore, we’d like to suggest following that vital lead which calls for a necessarily non-utilitarian approach.

Theory of the Humanimal Link: Reclus and Kropotkine

While animal farming is of course used for producing milk, meat and manure, i.e. for producing goods, it offers – as a second central rationality – the production of links. Farming contributes to humans and animals living together (Porcher, 2010b). This anti-utilitarian filiation refers to the gift theory, as developed by Marcel Mauss, and of which the journal MAUSS (Anti-Utilitarian Movement in Social Sciences) is, today in the Francophone world, one of the main platforms. Within this framework, domestication is not understood as a form of exploitation but, rather, as one of the oldest social contracts, with each member finding mutual advantage in co-operating with the other, and to this end agreeing to a set of behavioural regulations. This idea is not new. Anarchist geographer, zoologist and exploiter Pierre Kropotkine (1906) demonstrated how mutual aid and collaboration are common practice in the animal world (insects, birds, wolves, monkeys and lions among others). They play a more fundamental role in the survival and selection of species than competition between individuals as put forward in the Darwinian approach. Highlighting the same relations among “savages” and barbarians, contrary to social Darwinism, Kropotkine makes of mutual aid the basis of human society.

Another precious example of the silent insurrection against the logic of the animal machine is given by Élisée Reclus. What he saw in animal farming was the relation that it created: “For themselves, the Denka only have huts or simple shelters, but for the sick cows, they build wonderfully clean infirmaries, always on drained lands, rising up like small islands in the middle of the plains. They live almost exclusively from the milk of their animals, cows and goats which let themselves be milked happily, but they could not agree to kill animals in good health (…)” (Reclus, 1905-1908, p.157).

According to Reclus, an animal is first of all a work companion: We also know that animals with bells are not tired as quickly as those without: the music made by the copper bell helps them in their work as much as the pride of having been chosen by men as the leader of the herd or the team (…) (p. 232). According to Reclus, always concerned about the struggle of the poor and the oppressed workers, the lesson is clear: animals and workers are the victims of industry:

“At least among humans, the oppressed can resist the league of oppressors and, through solidarity in their revolt, though association in their efforts, they have already won many victories; but what can animals do? They do not go on strike and we could not wait for their lot to improve if it meant waiting for a gradual increase in farmers’ and masters’ intelligence and goodness” (p. 246).

Far from reaching secessionist conclusions recommending the reintroduction of domestic animals in the wild, he suggests, on the contrary, to educate animals with humans as guides.

Animal Exploitation and Human Exploitation

Following the relation and intimacy pathway, does not mean closing one’s eyes to the violence induced by the relation, a violence which is shared nonetheless between humans and animals in historical and social conditions that are just as specific.

We can follow Carl Griffin (2011) in his description of the transformation of intimate relations between humans and animals, in 18th-century English stables, at the time when agrarian capitalism was developing. The violence perpetrated by farm laborers on animals was not meaningless: not only was it addressed to the owners who exploited them, but they were also
deliberately staged as the parodic and cruel mirror of the loving bond. The development of agrarian capitalism is analyzed here, not only as a dispossession of the tool (peasants becoming proletarians), but also as a fundamental breach in complicity relationships at work, between proletarianised humans, and animals that have become embodied capital.

The issue raised by Griffin makes it possible to revive the founding antispeciesist argument, which is to oppose any form of animal exploitation. Indeed, Griffin sees a symmetrical relation between the lot of animals and the exploitation of humans. If we follow his approach, and thus deal symmetrically with animal and human exploitations, what definition of exploitation should we consider? According to the Marxist principle, any form of wage labor (carried out by individuals who only have their labour power to sell, in a capitalist mode of production) is a form of exploitation (since those who possess the capital only pay laborers up to the labour power reproduced). In this light, demanding animal liberation makes little sense if it is disconnected from the symmetrical demand for the liberation of human exploitation, which is the historical goal of communism. What is at stake is the production system as a whole, and the power relations structuring it.

Yet, abandoning what can represent exploitation, i.e. wage labor, today, would mean putting aside an essential part of what forges social link in the capitalist system: wages first of all, but also redistributive mechanisms (unemployment fund, pension, health insurance) and work-related social relations (professional sociability or modes of consumption).

Admitting that, it is possible to exit exploitation from the top, i.e. by joining a non-industrial community whose aim is to be autonomous from the capitalist system (oulike with French Zones à défendre). In the first hypothesis it is probably possible to reinforce the “Maussian” part of our exchange system, including – and perhaps first of all (?) – concerning work, as we’ll see later on. However, one might also downfall from exploitation (and this is what probably happens in the majority of cases). In this case, individuals who fall out of wage labor enter the reserve army of labour, whose disorganization organized by the management of the production system (through increased changes in working hours and workplaces, the weakening of trade unions and employment contracts, among others), builds-up what Marx calls Lumpenproletariat: a ragged proletariat, who can no longer reach class consciousness and even necessarily becomes, an objective allied of capital owners. Could it be otherwise for animals? Would they be better off with the end of exploitation? or worse? What type and what level of violence would be reached compared to what happens in a capitalist system of exploitation?

Labor as a Mode for Living Together?
While the issue of animal labor or animal subjectivity has been considered by some sociologists and anthropologists, it has never been taken seriously when it comes to domestic animals. For Marx (2014 [1867]), domestic animals do not work because they are not aware of their action; they only do what nature programmed them for. With no investment, no creativeness, no deviation of the prescribed task, there is no “worked in the making” (“travaillé” as described in Dejours, 2016). From this standpoint, bees are not architects but simply the vehicles of the laws of nature, which they only invariably reproduce. Social sciences have for long assumed there was a clear cut between socially-relevant work and nature, although Max Weber did formulate the hypothesis (2003 [1919]) that a sociology of relations between humans and animals was possible.
Tim Ingold (1983) suggested thinking, against Marx, that animals work because their actions are intentional. This conscious activity, according to Ingold, is created by social relations which give it meaning. Indeed, when they have no relation with us, bees or beavers do not work strictly speaking, even if hypothetically from their standpoint and in their world, they might actually consider they do work. However, it appears that cows, dogs and horses, among others, are intentionally involved in working (Ecologie and Politique, 2017) because they are domesticated, i.e. they have been part of the human world of work for hundreds or thousands of years already. In fact, from their birth on, they are implicated in the world of work.

Due to this complete implication, work cannot be defined and be limited to an activity only meant for production. It is first formed by a link, meaning and shared living conditions. Work requires a lively activity somewhere between the prescribed task and operating prescriptions, which are always insufficient for them to be enacted. This gap requires subjectivity, because it gives space for interpretation, that is: enacting freedom.

The fact that work is a place for potential alienation, as previously mentioned in the neo-Marxist analysis of Carl J. Griffin, does not mean that it cannot also open new possibilities. Thinking through animal labor changes what we know or think we know of animals, but it also changes what we think of labour itself, as encompassing different rationales, the first of which is the social link or companionship rationale (Dejours, 1993). Allowing for a potential life growth, a potential for companionship, work can become an ethical horizon, or even a form of good.

Considering the work issue radically transforms the way we understand domestication: our relations are not primarily grounded in domination, but in the freedom offered by working together. Work can then be seen as a moment of transformation, a moment to develop capacities and different forms of sensibility, of which neither animals nor humans were conscious before engaging in. For a skilled rider, the positions and movements of the horses he works with become a well-articulated language, while it remains totally imperceptible for the unexperienced. For a skilled jumping horse, his rider’s intentions are also self-evident considering how bodies mutually adapt to one another.

Living Differently Here and There, with Many Different Animals

It seems that there is still a vast field of studies to cover. In this paper, we hope to have shown that the issue of animal status, according to diverse classification criteria, is always socially, historically, economically and geographically grounded. Of course, within this framework, it appears that thinking about animal justice must not be carried out from an abstract perspective, but in relation to species and specific contexts.

Accordingly, the issue differs when considering for example the space taken by insects, or by large mammals. The former are easily considered as an undesirable species that can be exterminated without further ado, or even without really thinking about the fact that they are living beings. They belong to the domain of bare life (zôè) – those whose extermination is not problematic (Agamben, 1997). Other animals, on the contrary, today, tend to join humans in the domain of full life (bios), rooted in biography and political dimension. It is in relation to them that the issue of justice is raised. Thus, depending on contexts and times, the realm of justice does not always include humans equally, it includes animals or doesn’t, as with insects or even mushrooms (Kirksey, Hekmrich, 2010).

Among the Achuars of the Amazon Basin, as studied by Philippe Descola (1986), humans and a large part of the animals, but also cultivated plants, are beings endowed with a soul that gives them comparable social and moral characteristics, even if they are not equal. This continuity
binds them all into relationships, duties and attentions that cannot be scorned for fear of being immediately punished. When Metekash is bitten by a lancehead viper, her husband, Chumpi, is mortified by his own responsibility. Having just obtained a gun, he had fired shots at a group of woolly monkeys, killing several and wounding others. By killing more than necessary during the hunt, and by not worrying about the wounded, he broke the implicit pact that binds the Achuars to the protecting spirits of the game. The hunt must remain an agreement, especially because hunters and hunted are related (Descola, 2005). Their being related does not prevent them from killing for food, or taking revenge within the framework of a vendetta, but the act of killing must be carried out in conformity with a set of rules. Observing these commitments towards other beings is in fact what makes humans complete beings, unlike the jaguar, a solitary killer, that does not respect anything.

The types of justification concerning animal’s fate, especially the critical topic of killing (Porcher, 2014), always call on a higher Good. It is on the basis of an implicit moral contract, hinged on the varied status of animals, that justice can be enacted. The death of an animal might be part of a balanced relationship including both, a good life provided by the farmer (Porcher, 2011), and the need to be able to live from this life in common by producing meat and milk. Fairly similarly, among the Achuars, for ones’ own sake, the death of an animal can be part of a negotiation with the protecting spirit of animals. In the case of euthanasia, animal death might also prevent unnecessary suffering because of wounds or some incurable illness.

In these configurations, where labor is a major type of relation; pigs, cows, dogs and chimpanzees own world can cohabitate with the world of humans, and structure a web of relations implying subjectivity and intelligence. The fact that this horizon of life in common is not always materialized doesn’t mean that labor doesn’t potentially offer that possibility.

Breeding is then made of gifts and counter-gifts. If Zootechnics, founded in the 19th century, aimed at building animal productions, by transforming animals into meat-, egg- and milk-supplying machines, it could only do so by trying to dissolve the existing links that existed between humans and animals.

**Conclusion**

For Gary Francione, a main abolitionist author, from a moral and social perspective, our delirious and confused way to think about animals can be qualified as moral schizophrenia: some being family members, while others are meals. Quite the opposite, we should, for everyone’s sake ensure the conditions for strictly separating humans from animals. While we finish reviewing these antispeciesist positions and platform, it seems though that the cure for this schizophrenia generates just as many bipolar contradictions. First in terms of epistemological coherence: antispeciesism fights against anthropocentrism, but at the same time cannot abandon the specificity of the human being. Antispeciesists reify binary categories, even though they pretend to contest them. The separatist solutions recommended seem problematic in terms of social justice, since they usually ignore the complexity of the relations between humans and animals – especially when they dismiss the killing and the shared exploitation and labor condition issues as something obvious. In terms of spatial justice, antispeciesism tends to promote separatist models or zoned forms of citizenships. Finally, in terms of environmental justice, the programme seems incapable to think through the animal issue in socio-environmental crises.
The issue of animal justice also helps us reconsider the nature-culture dichotomy. A large part of the animalist argumentation is based on the human-animal analogy, or even equality between them, at least as far as sentient animals are concerned. This could, theoretically, lead to the abolition of the dichotomy, or to its blurring indeed, animalist works on justice attest a will to enact socio-animal justice, one valid for all sentient beings. We also see, in Donaldson’s and Kymlicka’s work, as well as Nussbaum’s, surfacing the domus, the “humanimal house” as the community of justice, which includes humans and animals (more specifically domestic animals in Donaldson and Kymlicka’s), and governs them by the same principles of justice. In both cases, interventionism on the animals of the house abolishes what could be considered as “nature”. But at the same time, we showed how practical antispeciesist measures aim at rebuilding this boundary, elsewhere or otherwise: any humanimal relation being permanently considered as wrong, the best solution, for animals’sake, would be to contain them in their animal world, and therefore outside of the sphere of justice.

It seems to us that the epistemological and political challenge today, is not so much about resolving these contradictions than about highlighting new thinking frontiers. It also raises the issue of how the interplay between the abolition and reconstruction of theoretical boundaries can backlash? The theories of animalist justice seek to include animals in justice, in order to guarantee them rights. But how this inclusion could also change relations between humans is not thought through. What animalist justice allows to imagine a mutual emancipation for humans and animals?

The idea of the blurring of the human-animal boundary can also be found in the work of many ethologists (Bekoff and Pierce, 2009; De Waal, 1997; Lorenz, 1969), who suggest we “naturalize” ethical behaviors. Chimpanzees, wolves and dolphins, among others, could show empathy, a sense of equity and co-operation implying proto-ethics. Ethics then, would no longer be specific to human beings, which would also apply to the notions of justice and injustice. In the political debate, naturalizing behavior or a social relation, is a tool which helps to make skills, links or relations of domination, invisible. The issue of justice should allow to raise issues in terms of social training, building of trust relationships, or care but also in terms of power relations. While we are no longer caught in the antispeciesists’ headlights, the issue of animals still calls for a genealogy of what has been driving the moral panic that we, as authors, that you, as readers, and more generally, that we have experienced worldwide as passive or active actors of the construction of this societal problem.

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References


